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Abstract 
 
In 2007 the TerraSAR-X satellite was successfully launched. Its payload consists of an earth observing Synthetic 
Aperture Radar, which supplies high resolution radar images. The yet to be launched TanDEM-X mission extends 
the TerraSAR-X mission with a second satellite of very similar capabilities. The two satellites will be flying in close 
formation (250m - 500m), such that the radar instruments can be synchronized (bistatic mode). This bistatic mode 
allows the generation of three dimensional pictures and thus a high resolution elevation model of the observed area 
(according to HRTI-3 specifications), which in the end should cover the whole earth. 
 
TanDEM-X is the first project worldwide to fly a close formation with a minimum distance of only a few hundred 
meters. During the development and integration of the ground segment, it became obvious that the amount of 
security measures have to be significantly increased to ensure safe operations. One of the main influences is the 
satellite orbit and attitude control system that is based on active control via hydrazine thrusters. The activation of the 
thrusters for attitude control possibly also changes the orbit, which leads to a change of the relative positions. 
Consequently two problems can appear, either mutual radar illumination which might damage electronic equipment 
or if the impulse is large enough, a collision.  
 
The paper gives an overview of how the various elements of the TanDEM-X ground segment, with main emphasis 
on the mission operations segment, had to be designed to provide a maximum degree of safety. This includes all 
aspects of operations, from ground station network and flight procedures to extended on-call services and 
specifically developed tools. It is shown how the operational design is influenced by the satellite design and how a 
different satellite design would have reduced the operational effort.  
It was originally planned to present the first real experiences with both satellite flying in close formation, but due to 
a launch delay to end of May 2010 this is unfortunately not possible. 
 
Nomenclature 
 
∆v = Velocity increment due to thruster activity 
e = Eccentricity of the satellite’s orbit 
i = Inclination of the satellite’s orbit; both e and i are treated as vectors by combining the numerical 
  value with the argument of perigee and the right ascension of the ascending node 
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I. Introduction 
TanDEM-X stands for TerraSAR-X add-on for Digital Elevation Measurement and consists of a pair of nearly 
identical satellites with the primary mission goal to generate a highly precise digital elevation model (DEM) of the 
complete surface of the earth with an accuracy better than 10 m. The main payload to perform this task is a synthetic 
aperture radar (SAR) on both satellites that allows high resolution images up to approx. 1m*1m pixel size. By 
synchronizing both SAR antennas, it is possible to generate interferometric pictures that in turn allow the production 
of the digital elevation model. To achieve the required elevation accuracy and to be able to synchronize the SAR 
antennas, the relative distance between both satellites has to be very small, from approx. only 200m up to 2000m.  
The first satellite TerraSAR-X (TSX) was launched in June 2007, and the first SAR images were taken and 
processed after only 5 days in orbit. Since then, TSX operations have been running very smoothly with a constant 
high quality of data products.  
The second satellite (TDX) of the TanDEM-X mission was planned for launch in October 2009. Unfortunately, 
the launch has been delayed until end of May 2010 due to unexpected problems with the radar hardware. Like TSX, 
TDX will be launched from Baikonur into a sun-synchronous dusk-dawn orbit with an altitude of about 515 km. 
TDX will be controlled with respect to TSX in a so-called helix formation with one complete cycle during one orbit, 
whereas TSX is controlled in a ±250m tube around a prescribed earth-fixed reference orbit, leading to an eleven day 
repeat cycle. The helix formation allows the adjustment of different baselines (i.e. basically the relative distance 
between TSX and TDX) which are directly influencing the DEM accuracy. The stability of the formation is 
achieved by so-called e-,i-vector separation (relative eccentricity / relative inclination, whereby maximum Δi occurs 
at the equator and maximum Δe near the poles; see 2).  Figure 1 gives a graphical overview: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Graphical illustration of the helix formation. During one orbital revolution TDX circles 
TSX with maximum cross-track separation at the equator and maximum radial separation near the 
poles. The picture on the right hand side shows how the effective baselines change during one orbit 
(from 4). 
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As described above, the minimum distance will be only about 200m, which from the beginning of the project 
raised the question about how safe such a formation can be with respect to collision. As a consequence the e-i-vector 
separation concept was introduced providing passive formation stability for at least two weeks during nominal 
mission (see 2). However, the design of the thruster based satellite safe mode, which is triggered in case of major 
problems (sensor problems, large attitude deviations or similar problems), is such that significant perturbations of 
the orbit are accepted in favour of quick stabilisation. In-flight experience with TSX safe modes also showed that 
distances of several hundred meters were easily exceeded. As consequence, the thruster based safe mode would 
suspend the passive formation stability within only a few hours. A new concept had to be developed. 
 
II. Safe formation flight 
After evaluating the safe modes experienced on TSX, the general problem – particularly with respect to the 
TanDEM-X mission – was identified quickly. In principle, two problem cases can appear: either illumination by the 
active radar of the other satellite, possibly damaging the electronics, or as absolute worst case a collision. Still both 
problems can only appear if the orbit is disturbed. In other words, as long as there are no unexpected thruster 
activities (maneuvers have to be considered differently), and therefore no unexpected orbit change of either satellite, 
there is no collision danger. Unfortunately, the safe mode was precisely based on the thrusters, therefore in any 
severe attitude problem the satellites would just use them and change their orbit unpredictably. While this was fine 
for a single satellite it became a problem for the formation. The satellite safe mode, designed to bring the satellite 
back to a nominal attitude as quick as possible, had become a potentially un-safe mode.  
Consequently, one of the first actions was to discuss with the satellite manufacturer, if a different safe mode 
without changing the orbit could be established. The solution was the introduction of an additional safe mode based 
upon the magnetic torque rods (ASM-MTQ) instead of the propulsion system (for details see 1). Since the torque 
rods only influence the attitude, this concept allows the satellite to survive in safe mode until the ground has time to 
identify the problem and recover the satellite without having to fear a potential collision. Further discussions 
revealed additional elements that needed either to be changed or newly developed to complement the on-board 
measures to ensure formation safety and shorten reaction times. Figure 2 gives an overview of the overall concept 
which will be described in more detail in following sections, with emphasis on the ground aspects. 
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Figure 2. Safe formation flight concept: The main element is the magnet-torquer based safe mode on 
the satellites that is invoked by the on-board FDIR logic in case of a severe contingency. 
Complementing the satellite are various ground elements to increase the formation safety and allow a 
manual reaction as fast as possible. (Abbreviations: MCS: Monitoring and Control System, MPS: 
Mission Planning System, FD: Flight Dynamics, HK: house-keeping) 
 
A. On-board FDIR concept and ASM-MTQ 
The introduction of the ASM-MTQ mode enables the satellite to stay in thrust-free safe mode long enough for 
the ground to detect and correct a possible error. Nevertheless there are restrictions: the magnetorquers were 
originally only designed for the de-saturation of the reaction wheels that act as prime actuators during nominal 
mission. Due to this fact, the magnetorquers are only strong enough to cope with contingencies that do not exceed 
certain boundaries; for TSX this means for example that only rotation rates of <2°/s can be handled safely due to the 
interaction cycle between measurement (magnetometers) and action (torquers). Since this is four times larger than 
all rates that are commanded on-board, this is sufficient for most problems. Still, there are contingencies that can not 
be handled; examples are a stuck-open thruster that spins up the satellite or damage of the magnetorquers themselves 
or their electronics. Therefore, the original thruster based safe mode (ASM-RCS – Reaction Control System) is still 
in place and serves as last resort in case the satellite gets into life-threatening state. In such a case, e.g. massive 
power and/or thermal problems due to looking into the sun or deep space, the on-board FDIR logic (Failure, 
Detection, Isolation and Recovery) triggers the ASM-RCS mode to re-establish a safe attitude – at the risk of 
illumination/collision. 
Since there are various reasons that might lead to such a life-threatening situation, the system answer is 
actually also more complex than just described. There will be several steps including on-board computer re-boots (to 
cope for possible problems due to S/W “hang-ups”) and the activation of redundant equipments, before the satellite 
changes back to the ASM-RCS mode,  The details are described in Ref. 1. The availability of the ground stations is 
an important point concerning the timing aspects of the FDIR concept and is discussed in the next section. 
 
B. Ground station network 
The original plan for the ground station network was based on the assumption that one contact every six 
hours would be sufficient for operations, especially for the uplink of maneuver commands necessary to keep the 
orbit and the formation.  However, worst case analysis by Astrium showed that after less than two hours the solar 
panel could be damaged by too low temperatures if constantly looking into deep space. Obviously, a six hour 
contact scheme would not allow timely ground interaction, even three hours would not be sufficient. Such a dense 
station network for a high inclination mission would be very expensive, and a tradeoff has to be made between effort 
and risk. Fortunately the above mentioned case is very unlikely: to begin with, the satellite must somehow be 
completely stable looking into deep space.  Second, when the thrusters are activated there must be enough impulse 
to reach (and hit!) the other satellite.  This also holds true for the danger of flying into the other spacecrafts’ 
illumination (Exclusion Zone). And lastly, the other satellite has to employ its radar just in this moment. All in all, 
the probability is very low, but still exists in the light of minimal risk considerations and the potential catastrophic 
result. 
After consolidation of the FDIR concept and the definition of the ASM-MTQ mode, it was agreed that the 
original six hour concept was sufficient to handle the most likely failure cases. Nevertheless improvements were 
necessary with respect to the data connection and redundancy. The FDIR concept allows the satellite to stay in 
ASM-MTQ indefinitely but in case of problems as the above mentioned power/thermal problem or too high rotation 
the thrusters will be activated. Since this case has to be avoided it is of the very important to dump the historic 
satellite data as quickly as possible to be able to analyze the problem.  
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Consequently the ground station network had to be improved in two ways: first, it had to offer enough 
redundancy in case one contact fails, and second it was necessary to implement redundant, high-rate data lines to 
transfer the dumped house-keeping data within a few minutes to GSOC.  The currently planned ground station 
network is shown in Figure 3.  
Figure 3. Ground Station Network for the TanDEM-X mission (Abbr: INUV: Inuvik, KIRU: Kiruna, SPZBG: 
Svalbard, NST: Neustrelitz, WHM: Weilheim, OHIG: O’Higgins) 
The primary ground stations for TSX are Weilheim and Neustrelitz in Germany which are DLR owned 
ground stations. Because of the dusk-dawn orbit these stations cover the early morning and early evening passages. 
Already in use for additional surveillance are Kiruna (Sweden) and Svalbard (Norway) that allow a 6h contact 
scheme, although the midnight passes usually have a very low elevation (below 5°). For TDX the network is 
expanded by additional DLR stations in Inuvik (Northern Canada) and O’Higgins (Antarctica). This concept 
provides sufficient redundancy for all passes:  
o Svalbard and/or Kiruna for Weilheim and/or Neustrelitz,  
o Svalbard <-> Kiruna for the noon passes 
o O’Higgins <-> Inuvik for the midnight passes (potentially Svalbard as well, but with very low 
elevation) 
Since Inuvik is a new ground station, Fairbanks is an option for the midnight passes in case there are problems but is 
not integrated right now. 
Both satellites are normally operated in parallel with their own dedicated team of operators. However, TSX 
experience and simulations with dual-satellite operations showed that as soon as there are problems with either or 
even both satellites it becomes very difficult to maintain parallel operations. Therefore, in case of a contingency it is 
foreseen that the team takes care of the satellite that has a problem and suspends parallel operation for the time 
being. It has also been taken care that all ground stations are aware and able to switch support from one to the other 
satellite on short notice (10 min before the pass) to be able to concentrate on one satellite. 
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C. Formation control 
The orbit control concept of TSX/TDX comprises two steps. First, TSX orbit control maneuvers are planned 
in order to keep TSX within its 250 m (radius) tube around its defined Earth-fixed reference orbit. To not affect the 
TSX/TDX formation, the TSX maneuvers have to be simultaneously replicated by TDX. Secondly, TDX-only 
maneuvers are planned to reconfigure and maintain the formation with TSX according to the DEM acquisition plan. 
While the first maneuvers are executed with Hydrazine thrusters, the smaller formation control maneuvers are 
primarily performed with TDX’s cold-gas system. Details on the absolute and relative orbit control concept are 
given in 2. 
Because of possible maneuver failures (including missed uplink) four problem cases have to be considered 
when dealing with absolute orbit control maneuvers: 
o TSX performs the maneuver, TDX not or partly  
o TDX performs the maneuver, TSX not or partly 
o the maneuvers are partly executed on both satellites 
o the maneuvers are not executed on both satellites 
The last case is without danger, since the (relative) orbit is not affected. However, the other three cases have 
to be considered within the Flight Dynamics System (FDS). Here, a dedicated software module propagates the TSX 
and TDX orbit determination results considering all possible maneuver failure scenarios to estimate the minimum 
distance of the two satellites in the plane perpendicular towards flight-direction. In case a pre-defined threshold (e.g. 
50 m) could become violated, the planned maneuvers are not released for commanding and the automated maneuver 
planning process stops. In that seldom case (3) the FD on-call engineer has to cross-check the results and possibly 
split the maneuver(s) in order to reduce the maneuver size and hence collision risk. 
 
D. Exclusion zones and sync warnings 
So far it has been described how the close formation is planned to be set up and what problems generally may 
arise due to unplanned thruster firing. Following that the changes and amendments to the satellite and the ground 
stations have been discussed and how the formation control is performed. In the next part it shall be described how 
operations are organized to ensure a maximum degree of safety.  
1. Exclusion Zones 
While FDS checks the maneuver planning to minimise the collision risk, the helix formation as such 
automatically inherits the danger of illumination. Consequently it has to be ensured that all data-takes are planned in 
the way that radar activities are prohibited in case one satellite crosses the line of sight of the other. Fortunately, 
knowing both the SAR instrument beam characteristics and the relative orbit geometry, so-called SAR transmit 
exclusion zones can be specified for each satellite. For example, from Figure 1 it can be seen that there will be no 
illumination close to the equator crossings because TSX and TDX are then horizontally separated, but on the way 
north or south one or the other will block the line of sight. 
The exclusion zone concept is shown in Figure 4 and comprises three checks. Initially, the TanDEM-X 
Acquisition Planner (TAP) specifies the satellite-specific exclusion zone geometry (Exclusion Zone Angles) based 
on the current helix formation. These contain the forbidden areas/angles in which all radar images are “excluded” to 
prevent possible damage (see also 1). The TAP also provides an Exclusion Zone Product for satellite upload to 
assure sufficient reliability (will be explained later). FD receives the exclusion zone angles and calculates from the 
relative orbit determination results the start and stop times of the Transmit Exclusion Windows (TEW).  
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TEWs are provided to the mission planning system (MPS) and to the exclusion zone checker (EZC), where 
the on-ground checks are performed. During each planning run MPS checks the TEWs and arranges the radar data-
takes accordingly. The EZC tool performs the final checking just before the commands are loaded into the 
monitoring and control system. This allows checking of data-takes planned outside MPS (e.g. maintenance or 
calibration data-takes) as well as the identification and elimination of wrongly planned data-takes due to an MPS 
error.  
The third and last recipient is the satellite itself to which the exclusion zone information is uploaded directly. 
It has to be noted however, that this information is not constantly updated and therefore can only be based on ideal 
formation geometry as considered by the TAP. Orbit control uncertainties are reflected by introducing angular 
margins, which of course can not account for maneuver failures. The on-board FDIR surveillance thus acts as last 
resort considering nominal spacecraft operations. It checks the data-takes briefly before and during execution and 
stops the radar transmission in case of a violation.  
 
 
Figure 4. The three stages of the Exclusion Zone Check 
 
Special care has to be taken when maneuvers are planned but not yet executed. Maneuver execution failures 
as discussed in section C do not imply a risk of collision but are still large enough to alter the formation and hence 
the exclusion zones. To handle this, FDS enlarges the Transmit Exclusion Windows after each maneuver to cope 
with a missed or partly failed maneuver. 
During the mission it is foreseen that the helix formation is changed several times to allow for different 
baselines. Only then, the TAP will provide the respective updates to flight dynamics and the satellites. Since the 
exclusion zone check only makes sense if the satellites are in close formation, the check is only active within an 
along-track distance of 10km. 
 
2. Sync Warnings 
Exclusion Zones are used to ensure the safety during nominal operations. But what happens if one satellite 
has a problem and does use the thrusters, even with low impulse. As described previously there might be situations 
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where the magnetorquers can not solve the problem (e.g. if the torquers themselves are damaged). Even so it is not 
likely that the satellites collide (the probability is very low after all) the satellite using its thrusters will definitely 
leave the pre-defined exclusion zones. To handle this problem an additional safety mechanism is implemented: the 
sync warnings. 
To be able to perform a TanDEM acquisition, it is necessary that TSX and TDX are synchronizing each other. 
The synchronisation is realized by inserting short radar pulses into the nominal imaging activities using dedicated 
synchronisation antennas for transmission and reception. Sync warning data-takes are special data-takes using 
exactly these antennas and that have a low enough power not to damage the other satellite. These data-takes are 
always sent bi-directional and are evaluated on-board and are independent of exclusion zones. In case one satellite 
does not receive the expected sync warning pulse of his counterpart, it is interpreted as non-nominal condition of the 
other satellite. As consequence the position of the other satellite is considered uncertain and to avoid possible 
illumination the radar transmission is suspended. 
 
E. On-call concept and parameter update 
Complementing the safety concept are two further elements. The TSX On-call concept originally only 
foresaw one person on-call, the flight operations manager, who then had to decide how to proceed. The experiences 
made with TSX in the past years lead to the decision to broaden the on-call team in such a way, that not only the 
flight operations manager (as team lead), but also the main subsystem engineers are on-call. Especially with regard 
to the quality and complexity of the TanDEM-X mission and its formation aspects this is seen as an important 
element.   
Connected with this is the necessity to always keep on eye on those parameters and configurations that 
change over time and keep them up to date. Especially when regarding the propulsion systems it is important that 
parameters that influence the performance are updated. An example for this is the amount of fuel left in the tanks. 
The emptier the tank is the lower is the tank pressure and the “weaker” is the impulse of the thrusters. If the 
maneuver calculation is not updated regularly the maneuvers will not have the desired effect. Other examples 
include the update of on-board FDIR settings. Even so this sounds (and is) trivial in a way, it has to be kept in mind, 
since once routine operations are established it is easy to delay such work. In a mission like TanDEM-X this should 
be avoided. 
 
III. Conclusions 
Originally it was planned to conclude the paper with the first in-orbit experiences of TSX and TDX. 
Unfortunately, the launch delay prevented the comparison of theory and real life. Still the authors hope that this 
paper gave an insight on the complexity and challenge of such a project. It should have become clear that even so 
many improvements have been made a certain risk will always remain. It should also have become clear, that if such 
a mission is planned the satellite design should be defined accordingly. For the TanDEM-X mission the idea of a 
close formation mission came only after the TSX design was finished, which meant that there were only few 
opportunities to adapt the design.  Nevertheless we think we found appropriate solutions and we are looking forward 
to the launch. 
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